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Abstract
We develop an endogenous growth model with heterogeneous agents who care
about their status in society. Following the social psychology literature, we formalise
the idea that the reference standard to which people compare themselves is a choice
variable. In such a framework, we analyse the determinants of the choice of the
reference standard and their eﬀects on growth and distribution. We show that
low skilled individuals can end up with a higher level of income than high skilled
individuals if their level of ambition is high enough. This is because what matters
for the choice of reference standard and inequality is the combination of skills and
ambitions of individuals. Moreover, as skills and ambitions aﬀect positively growth,
we find that growth and inequalities can be either negatively or positively correlated.
JEL Classification: O41.
Keywords: reference standard, relative position, inequality, growth.
∗Address: 126/1 Vibhavadee-Rangsit Road, Dindaeng, Bangkok, 10400, Thailand. Fax: +66 (0)2692
3168; E-mail: frederic.tournemaine@uc-utcc.org
†Address: Dept. of Economics, London Metropolitan University, 84 Moorgate, London EC2M 6SQ,
UK. E-mail: c.tsoukis@londonmet.ac.uk
1
1 Introduction
The idea that individuals derive utility not only from their level of consumption but also
from their relative position in society is by now well established and supported by em-
pirical evidence (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Maurer and Meier, 2008). Among the issues
investigated in the literature are the impact of such social comparisons relations on eco-
nomic growth (Corneo and Jeanne, 1997; Rauscher, 1997; Futagami and Shibata, 1998;
Fisher and Hof, 2000; Tournemaine and Tsoukis, 2008a), education (Fershtman, Murphy
and Weiss, 1996), fertility (Tournemaine, 2008), and distribution (Pham, 2005; Tsoukis,
2007; Tournemaine and Tsoukis, 2008b, 2008c).
The formalization of individuals’ positional concern usually consists of assuming that
individuals’ social status is determined by their level of wealth, consumption or education
relative to a reference standard which is taken to be, for simplicity, the arithmetic average
in the economy. There is however no reason to think that the reference standard, or target,
to which individuals compare themselves is the average itself or/and that this reference
standard is the same for all individuals: diﬀerent individuals may weigh diﬀerently their
own and others’ performances. This argument finds some support in social psychology
where it is argued that individuals play an active role in the choice of their reference
standards (see e.g. Diener and Fujita, 1997). As explained in detail by Falk and Knell
(2004), individuals face a trade-oﬀ between two kinds of goal in choosing their reference
standards. First, the goal of “self-enhancement” whereby people prefer to compare them-
selves to low achievers to get the illusion of a high status, though this is not necessarily
the case in reality. Second, the goals of “self-achievement” that can be interpreted as a
sign of motivation as individuals seek for high goals and compare themselves with high
achievers.
In this paper, we seek to formalise the above ideas in considering that the reference
standard to which individuals compare themselves is a choice variable. We have sought
to capture the ”self-achievement” motive via the inducement to eﬀort that status-seeking
generates; this comes from both the status eﬀect on utility and its eﬀect in the disutility of
labour (on which more shortly). The ”self-enhancement” eﬀect, on the other hand, induces
less aspiration the lower down one is in the consumption distribution. Contrary to Falk
and Knell (2004) who conduct their theoretical analysis in a static framework, we develop
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an endogenous growth model. To the growing literature on the macroeconomic eﬀects
of ”keeping up with the Joneses”, social comparisons and status, we add three elements:
Firstly, the endogenous reference standards and aspirations (see also Tournemaine and
Tsoukis, 2008c); we also add the fact that status may aﬀect the disutility of labour,
on the basis that ”status jobs” induce more work eﬀort among people (Falk and Knell,
2004; Tournemaine and Tsoukis, 2008b). Furthermore, to analyse the determinants of
the choice of reference standards and raise the important issue of inequality and growth,
we introduce heterogeneity among individuals. While heterogeneity in skills is a standard
way to generate income inequality, heterogeneity in the valuation of social comparisons is
introduced to capture the idea that individuals may have diﬀerent levels of ambition (as
in Tournemaine and Tsoukis, 2008b). Formally, we assume that heterogeneity stems both
from innate skills and the valuation of social comparisons. These are novel elements in
the analysis of status, or social comparisons, as is, a fortiori, the combined introduction
of all three. The latter two (status-aﬀected eﬀort and idiosyncratic status motivation) are
related to the endogenous references standards, or targets, indeed they underpin them
in ways that will become clearer below, so that the choice of (endogenous) reference
standards is the focal point of the paper. Thus, our contribution in this paper is twofold:
first, to introduce endogenous reference standards combined with associated aspects of
status; and second, to investigate their eﬀects on growth, distribution, and in particular,
on the vexed issue of the relationship between the two.
One would eﬀectively expect that ambitious individuals are more motivated than the
ordinary man, set up higher reference standards, and devote more time to working activ-
ities to achieve their goals. Therefore, one would conjecture that the valuation of social
comparisons aﬀects not only the choice of reference standard (status) but also inequality
and long-run growth. The results we get go in this direction. We demonstrate that low
skilled individuals can end up with a higher level of income than high skilled individuals
if their ambitions are suﬃciently high. This is because the crucial factor aﬀecting the
choice of reference standard of individuals and the resulting degree of inequality is the
relative combination of skills and ambitions. Moreover, as both skills and ambition aﬀect
positively growth, we show that growth and inequality can be positively or negatively
correlated, a result which fits with the lack of consensus of the literature on this matter.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. We present the model in Section
3
2. We characterise the equilibrium and examine its key properties in Section 3 and 4,
respectvely. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Model
We consider a closed economy where time is continuous and denoted by t : t ∈ [0,∞).
There is a mass [0, 1] of infinitely-lived individuals divided into two groups of identical
individuals denoted by i, i = 1, 2. Group 1 has size β and group 2 has size 1 − β. Each
individual is initially endowed with ki0 > 0 units of capital (wealth) at date zero and T
units of labour-time. She produces an output, yit, which can be consumed, cit, or invested
to give new units of capital, kit. Assuming that each unit of output devoted to investments
yields one new unit of capital, we have:
yit = cit +
•
kit. (1)
Following Romer (1986), the technology for output is given by
yit = Ai(kit)α(ktlit)1−α, (2)
where 0 < α < 1, Ai > 0 is a time-invariant productivity parameter specific to indi-
viduals of group i, lit is the amount of time devoted to the production of output and
kt ≡ (k1t)β (k2t)(1−β) is the geometric average stock of capital (learning by investing).
Technology (2) captures the idea that individuals benefit from a diﬀerent level of tech-
nology or have diﬀerent innate skills, Ai. Without loss of generality, we assume that
A1 ≥ A2.
Individuals derive utility from their level of consumption and social comparison. They
incur disutility through working time spent in the production of output. Social com-
parisons are made via the ratio of the level of consumption, cit, to a specific reference
standard, cit, given by:
cit = γitct, (3)
where ct = (c1t)
β (c2t)
(1−β) is the geometric average level of consumption and γit > 0 is
a strictly positive scalar. In the specification of the reference standard (3), the novelty
is twofold. First, as mentioned, one key aspect of social comparison is that the reference
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standard to which individuals compare themselves is not necessarily given by the average
level of consumption in the economy: in contrast with the standard literature, γit is
not necessarily set equal to one. Second, this reference standard is actively chosen by
individuals as γit is a choice variable. The reference standard (3), though endogenous,
depends on the average level of consumption, that is on people’s overall performances.
Thereby, parameter γit regulates the importance of this average for social comparisons.
Formally, a low value of γit means that individuals choose a low reference standard which
may give them the feeling of a high status. In contrast, a high value of γit reduces the
perception of status by individuals which can be seen as a sign of a high motivation.
Preferences of individual i are represented by
Ui =
∞Z
0
[ln cit + ηiΨ(cit/cit)− δ (lit)Ψ(cit/cit)] e−ρtdt, (4)
where ρ > 0 is the rate of time preference, δ > 0 is a parameter accounting for the
marginal disutility of work, Ψ (•) , which is strictly increasing and concave, is the social
comparison function and ηi is an agent-specific preference parameter measuring individu-
als’ idiosyncratic attitude to status motivation or social comparison, with 0 < ηi < δT to
ensure the existence of an interior solution in the steady state. Accordingly, as mentioned,
heterogeneity stems from the idiosyncratic status-related motivation as well idiosyncratic
innate productivity. As will be seen, cit is positively related to ηi. Ceteris paribus ηi can
be interpreted as a proxy for individuals’ ambition.
As mentioned, the reference standard, cit, is chosen so as to accomplish the goals of
“self-enhancement” and “self-improvement”. The utility function (4) captures this feature
in that cit, has both negative and positive eﬀects. While the negative eﬀect manifests itself
in a standard way through the reduction of status’ perception, the positive eﬀect manifests
itself through the reduction of the disutility of work as suggested by Falk and Knell (2004),
Tournemaine and Tsoukis (2008b): high goals give more motivation to individuals who
then can feel less tired to work.
The fact that the function Ψ(cit/cit) is used to account for both the positive and
negative eﬀects of the reference standard must be seen as a way to simplify computations
and get solutions that can easily be interpreted. To further simplify the analysis, we follow
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Corneo and Jeanne (1997), Futagami and Shibata (1998) and set:
Ψ
µ
cit
cit
¶
=
µ
cit
cit
¶φ
, (5)
where 0 < φ ≤ 1.
3 Equilibrium
Each individual chooses consumption, labor, reference standard and wealth to maximize
(4) subject to (1) and (2). In solving this problem, we assume that individuals take the
consumption levels c1t and c2t as given: ∂cit/∂cit = 0, for i = 1, 2. That is, we consider
that individuals are so small that the change of consumption of any of them does not
aﬀect the reference standard chosen by individual i.
After manipulation, the current-value Hamiltonian of this problem for individual i is
CVH = ln cit + ηi(cit/cit)
φ − δ (lit) (cit/cit)φ + λit[Ai (kit)α (ktlit)1−α − cit], where λit is
the co-state variable associated with (1). The first order conditions are ∂CV H/∂cit = 0,
∂CV H/∂lit = 0, ∂CV H/∂γit = 0 and ∂CV H/∂kit = −
•
λit + λitρ. The transversality
condition is lim
t→∞
λitkite−ρt = 0. Rearranging the first order conditions, we get:
1
cit
"
1 + φ (ηi − δlit)
µ
cit
cit
¶φ#
= λit, (6)
δlit = ηi, (7)
(1− α)yit
litcit
= δ
µ
cit
cit
¶φ
, (8)
αyit
kit
+
•
λit
λit
= ρ. (9)
In the rest of the paper we restrict attention to the steady-state. In this case the growth
rate of variables must be common across agents otherwise someone would end up owning
the whole of the economy asymptotically (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, ch. 3).
As a result, all the key ratios, like relative consumption between groups, consumption-
to-capital, output-to-capital, as well as the labour supply and the weights individuals
put on average consumption to determine the reference standards are all constant. Time
subscripts are dropped when quantities are constant, but kept for perpetually growing
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variables. We denote by g the common growth rate of capital, consumption and output.
Simple manipulation of (1)-(9) allows us to characterise the steady-state equilibrium.
Results are summarised in Proposition 1. Their analysis is gathered in Section 4.
Proposition 1 The amount of labour, li, allocated to output production is given by:
li =
ηi
δ
. (10)
Individual’s i social status is given by:
cit
cit
=
½
(1− α) (g + ρ)
ηi [(1− α)g + ρ]
¾1/φ
. (11)
The common rate of growth, g, and the relative amounts of capital, consumption and
income, k1t/k2t, c1t/c2t, y1t/y2t,verify:
g =
α (A1)
β (A2)
(1−β) (η1)
(1−α)β (η2)
(1−α)(1−β)
δ1−α
− ρ, (12)
k1t
k2t
=
c1t
c2t
=
y1t
y2t
=
η1
η2
µ
A1
A2
¶ 1
1−α
. (13)
The weights, γ1, γ2, chosen by individuals are given by:
γ1 =
µ
c1t
c2t
¶(1−β)½η1 [(1− α)g + ρ]
(1− α) (g + ρ)
¾1/φ
. (14)
γ2 =
µ
c1t
c2t
¶−β ½η2 [(1− α)g + ρ]
(1− α) (g + ρ)
¾1/φ
. (15)
Proof. Labour supply follows directly from (7). Combining (1), (2), (8), (9) and (10)
yields (11). Combining (1), (2) and (9) leads to equations (12) and (13). Using (3), (11)
and (13), we get (14) and (15).
4 Choice of reference standard, inequality and growth
4.1 Steady-state under symmetry
Before turning to the examination of the model under heterogeneity, it is instructive
to look at the outcomes under the simplifying assumption of symmetry. When A1 =
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A2 = A and η1 = η2 = η, individuals share both the same technology and valuation of
social comparison. Thereby, individuals have the same ability and willingness to produce,
to consume and to save. Moreover, as the sources of heterogeneity have vanished, the
reference standard to which individuals compare themselves turns out to be the same.
Though, equations (14) and (15) show that in general individuals do not set the average
level of consumption as a reference standard: γ1 = γ2 = γ can be greater or lower than
one. Whether γ > 1 or γ < 1 depends on individuals’ characteristics. We have:
Proposition 2 Higher values of the social comparison parameter, η, rate of time prefer-
ences, ρ, and marginal disutility of working, δ, favour upward comparisons while a higher
level of skills, A, is likely to favour downward comparisons.
The fact that people have mainly upward comparisons was suggested years ago by
Duesenberry (1949) and confirmed empirically by Bowles and Park (2005). This paper,
then, provides a possible explanation for this fact. Whether social comparisons are made
in an upward or downward manner depends on the balance between the goals of “self
enhancement” and “self achievement”, i.e. on how individuals’ characteristics aﬀect the
balance between these two kinds of goals.
Intuitively, as a higher value of η means a greater level of ambition, individuals set up
higher reference standards: a greater motivation to work turns the trade-oﬀ between the
goals of “self enhancement” and “self achievement” towards the “self achievement” ones.
In the case of a greater rate of time preferences, ρ, individuals become more impatient.
They incur a reduction in the subjective valuation of the utility derived in the future
relative to the valuation of the current utility. Hence, we would expect individuals to
spend more resources on fulfilling current needs, whereby individuals reduce their savings
to increase their present consumption. This in turn leads to an increase of their reference
standards. As regards to a higher marginal disutility of work, δ, the reason is simply that
individuals are more willing to set up higher reference standards in order to reduce their
disutility from working. Finally, a higher level of skills, A, allows individuals to perform
better in that they achieve higher levels of income, capital and consumption. Ceteris
paribus, this means that individuals choose easier goals relative to their abilities.
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4.2 Steady-state under heterogeneity
We now analyse the steady-state under heterogeneity in skills and valuation of social com-
parisons (i.e. ambition). The crucial question here is whether the original skills inequality
is amplified or attenuated by individuals’ level of ambition and how the combination of
these two sources of heterogeneity are transmitted to economic growth.
Figure 1 represents the set of possible outcomes of our model for the choice of reference
standard and the relative level of consumption of individuals as a function of η2 for given
values of A1, A2, η1 and under the assumption A1 > A2.
Insert Figure 1 Here
From Figure 1, three kinds of outcomes are possible. First, if η2 < η1 (A1/A2)
φ
(1−α)(1+φ) ,
individuals of group 1 set up higher reference standards and end up with a higher level
of capital, consumption and income than individuals of group 2. Note that if η2 < η1
individuals of group 2 have the feeling that they achieve a higher status than individuals of
group 2: c1t/c1t < c2t/c2t (see equation (11)), whereby we may argue that for individuals of
group 2 “[b]etter be first in a village than second in a town”. The reason is that the trade-
oﬀ between the goals of “self enhancement” and “self achievement” turns out towards the
“self achievement” ones for individuals of group 1 and towards the “self enhancement”
ones for individuals of group 2. While individuals of group 1 reduce their disutility from
work through high consumption targets, individuals of group 2 prefer to derive utility
from the feeling of a high status. If, however, individuals of group 2 are more ambitious
(η2 > η1) the above trade-oﬀs are reversed and it results a higher status for individuals
of group 1: c1t/c1t > c2t/c2t.
Second, if η2 ∈ [η1 (A1/A2)
φ
(1−α)(1+φ) ; η1 (A1/A2)
1
(1−α) ], individuals of group 2 set up
higher reference standards than those chosen by individuals of group 1 (γ2 > γ1). This
dampens inequalities due to innate skills: individuals of group 2 compensate partially
their lack of productivity (A1 > A2) through a greater amount of hours worked: l2 > l1.
Finally, if η2 > η1 (A1/A2)
1
(1−α) , the level of ambition of individuals of group 2 is high
enough to reverse the gap of inequalities initially due to innate skills.
Gathering the above results we can now establish the property of the model re-
garding growth and inequality. Since growth rises unambiguously with average skills,
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(A1)
β (A2)
(1−β) , and average valuation of social comparison, (η1)
β (η2)
(1−β) (see equation
(12)), we have:
Proposition 3 Growth and inequality can be negatively or positively correlated.
The noteworthy feature about Proposition 3 is that its result fits with the lack of
consensus found in the literature. For instance, Persson and Tabellini (1994) present
cross-country evidence of a negative eﬀect of inequality on growth. In contrast, Partridge
(1997) concludes that greater inequality is associated with greater growth. Other studies,
finally, argue that changes in income and changes in inequality are unrelated (Deninger
and Squire, 1996; Chen and Ravallion, 1997).
Thus, in addition to reconciling these views, the present framework provides a more
balanced perspective which relies on a simple argument. The relationship between growth
and inequality is ambiguous because capital accumulation which gives the pace of eco-
nomic growth depends on the absolute levels of skills and ambition of people (skills aﬀect-
ing directly production of output and social comparison acting indirectly through labour
supply), whereas the degree of inequality between individuals is the outcome of the rel-
ative combination of these two factors. That is, whether inequality is greater or lower
due to changes in relative skills or/and ambition of individuals, the eﬀects on economic
growth are always positive.
5 Conclusion
We have developed a simple growth model with heterogeneous individuals who care about
social comparisons. The core contribution is that social comparisons are made in an
endogenous manner as individuals choose the reference standards to which they compare
themselves. We have highlighted the eﬀects of heterogeneity from skills and valuation of
social comparison (ambition) on the choice of reference standard, inequality and growth.
In doing so, we have pointed out the ways by which these interrelated concepts impinge
on macroeconomic outcomes.
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Figure 1 : Inequality and choice of reference standard 
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